Senate Reform and the Political Safeguards of Canadian Federalism in Québec
Jean-Christophe Bédard-Rubin* Unlike in Canada, the doctrine of political safeguards of federalism is a tantalizing presence in American constitutional law that changing tides and moods have never completely submerged.
e core idea is simple: political institutions in the United States have been designed to ensure that interests of the states are represented in the federal decision-making process. us, the judiciary does not need to intervene to police the federal division of powers. [T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power. 2 e idea was not new, but it has had periods of latency and revival in American constitutional law. 3 In the classical formulation of the doctrine, the United States Senate is perhaps the most important safeguard of American federalism. 4 It is a strong upper chamber with an e ective legislative veto that, unlike most other bicameral systems in the world, cannot be overruled by the other proportional chamber (i.e. the House of Representatives). 5 Because every state has two senators -and thus, an equal voice in this part of the national legislative process, be it Wyoming with 585 000 inhabitants or California with 39 250 000 inhabitants 6 -the Senate can be a stronghold of state interests and play quite an important political role.
e political fate of the Canadian Senate has not been as salient as its American counterpart. It was already seen as a moribund institution in the middle of the twentieth century and has remained as such until recently. 7 For example, in 2016, a careful observer like Wade K. Wright could still note that "there is fairly widespread agreement that the Senate has proven to be largely ine ective as a political safeguard of federalism. "
8 However, in light of the Trudeau government's new Senate appointment policy and institutional reform, the meaning and the role of the Senate in Canada's constitutional architecture might change. e Senate reform could transmute what was a politically moribund institution into a genuine political safeguard of Canadian federalism. e path is neither straightforward nor ineluctable, but recent events seem to suggest that Québec, at least, is willing to step into that newly-opened door.
e aim of this article is to chronicle this change by focusing on Québec's recent attempts to channel its political grievances through the Senate.
Representation and Legitimacy or Vice-Versa
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's reform of the appointment process to the Senate came at the end of a long and winding road. e Conservatives and the Reform Party before them had repeatedly promised a "Triple-E" Senate, one that is equal, elected and e ective. While in power with a majority Government, however, the e orts of Stephen Harper's Conservative Government were stopped by the 2014 Senate Reference 9 in which the Supreme Court of Canada more or less closed the door to senatorial election without a formal constitutional amendment to that e ect. Despite the Court's ruling, there seemed to be a growing consensus in Ottawa that things could not stay as they were especially a er a string of scandals plagued prominent senators contemporaneously to the Senate Reference decision. 10 us, the Liberals' revival of the Senate as a chamber of "sober second thought" can be seen either as a consolation prize or as a real attempt to reinvigorate a dying institution and retrieve its authentic meaning and mission. Regardless of one's reading of the situation, the Liberals might have succeeded in achieving a genuine reform neither by undergoing the stringent constitutional amendment process nor by transforming the Senate into another elective house of Parliament.
11 First, on January 29, 2014, while in the opposition, Trudeau's Liberal party excluded senators from its caucus, thus providing the "liberal"-now-independent senators with the political independence necessary to exercise their political judgment without the oversight of the Party Whip. Second, shortly a er taking power in October 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that he would use a new procedure to select senators, a procedure that "is designed to help ensure that the Senate is independent, re ective of Canada's diversity, and best able to tackle the broad range of challenges and opportunities facing the country. " 12 e combination of the new appointment process and the severance of the political ties of senators was likely to modify the work of the Senate. By replacing political patronage with competence, the Liberals could reinvigorate the Senate and build its institutional legitimacy. e Senate has resolutely felt emboldened by the change; in the rst two years of the Trudeau Government, the Senate has amended about 25 percent of the bills passed in the House of Commons. By comparison, during the ten previous Parliaments, the Senate amended, on average, seven percent of House bills -an important change to say the least. 13 It is interesting to note, in this respect, that it is precisely because the Senate is not elected that it can potentially play its role of advocating for the di erent regions of the country. If it were to become an elected upper house of Parliament, it is unlikely that senators would run on totally di erent platforms than the MPs of the House of Commons. In the United States, for example, the original design of the Senate gave an equal representation of two senators per state in order to protect the interests of the states. Senators were to be sent to the United States Congress a er having been nominated by their State legislature. ese senators could indeed be a decentralizing force and protect state interests because they had a clear political incentive to do so; they were appointed by state authorities themselves. However, from the middle of the 19 th century onwards, some states started to directly elect their senators. By 1910, 28 out of 46 states had changed their appointment procedures and most senators were thus directly elected.
14 With the adoption of the seventeenth Amendment (1913) that provides for the direct election of all senators by the population of every state, the structural mechanisms do not play their initial role anymore. Citizens are generally more interested in what governments do than which government does it. us, senators do not have any incentive anymore to favor decentralizing policies to centralizing ones, as long as it is in the interest of their constituency. 15 Senators then become the protectors of regionally-based interests rather than state (or provincial) jurisdiction. 16 e new situation in the Canadian Senate is di erent. At the present time, it is composed of 54 independent and 6 non-a liated senators out of 101 sitting senators. 17 As the Senate becomes more independent, legitimate, and assertive, it will almost inevitably become a new locus of political contention over provincial jurisdiction. One could say that it is a matter of political physics; legitimacy brings political power which, in turn, attracts groups that want to have their interests represented. is is especially true for interests groups whose voices cannot be channeled elsewhere because of the speci c design of the political institutions or because of broader political dynamics. One can hardly argue that Québec has been an underrepresented player in Canadian federal institutions. However, the very design and history of the Senate and the new political tides in La Belle Province all converge in shedding new light on the potentially critical role of the upper chamber of Parliament in voicing Québec's grievances on federalism matters.
Targeting the Senate as the Protector of Canadian Federalism
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Québec seized the opportunity o ered by a reinvigorated upper house to channel its speci c political demands. In merely two years, from October 2016 -when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed the rst cohort of independent senators -to November 2018, the status of the Senate in Qué-bec politics has noticeably changed. Politicians of all stripes have repeatedly asked the Senate to stand up to protect the Canadian federal division of powers and to stop the Liberal Government when its ambitions are seen as encroaching on Provincial prerogatives. ere have been three main events that have led to a senatorial call to arms by Québec. e rst was the introduction of Bill C-29 by the Trudeau Government on October 25, 2016. e bill was meant to reform the regulation of banks with some provisions respecting consumer protections. e timing was especially illchosen for such a reform. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada had just recognized that the application of Québec's Consumer Protection Act, a "characteristic of Québec's identity" according to University of Ottawa and former Québec Minister of Justice Benoît Pelletier, 18 to banks does not impair the federal legislative jurisdiction over bank lending. 19 e adoption of Bill C-29 would have jeopardized the application of the Québec Consumer Protection Act to banks, a hard-fought win for Québecers that they were visibly unwilling to let go.
In the face of this turn of events, the National Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on November 29, 2016 requiring that the federal government "withdraws the provisions of its Bill C-29 […] that would render inapplicable the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act regulating the relation between banks and their clients. " 20 When the Bill nally passed the House of Commons despite Québec's explicit demands, the Premier voiced his opinion outside the National Assembly and interjected his case directly to the Senate. 21 He asked "the Canadian Senate to play its role, the role of defender of Canada's regions and to stand up, and to say that it is out of the question to endorse such encroachment and amputation of Québec's jurisdiction. "
22 His voice was apparently heard because the Government, a er the Senate expressed some concerns regarding this part of the bill, decided to withdraw the article that would have endangered the application of the Québec Consumer Protection Act.
e same scenario occurred in June 2017 when the federal budget bill, in addition to creating the Canada Infrastructure Bank, would have enabled the Government to designate it as a Crown agent for the purpose of speci c infrastructure projects. Like other Crown corporations, the Bank could have been exempted from the application of provincial laws and municipal regulations. Québec's National Assembly again appealed to the Senate to block this part of the 2017-2018 Budget Bill. On May 31, 2017, the National Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution that "requires that Bill C-44, currently in the House of Commons, be amended to ensure that the Canada Infrastructure Bank is bound by the laws of Québec. " 23 e motion was sent to "the Federal Government, the Federal MPs from Québec and the senators. " 24 Senator André Pratte speci cally channeled this concern in the Senate 25 and Patrick Taillon, professor of constitutional law at Laval University, testi ed in the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce to warn senators about the possible power imbalance that this bill would create between the federal government and the provinces. Pratte introduced a motion to sever the Infrastructure Bank from the remainder of the Budget Bill, but his motion was defeated and, despite e orts to amend it, the bill was adopted in the Senate without amendment.
e most important stando between the House of Commons and the Senate since the reform of its appointment process was probably over the legalization of cannabis. e House of Commons passed Bill C-45 to legalize cannabis in November 2017. By doing so, they ful lled one of the main promises of the Liberal Party of Canada during the 2015 electoral campaign. When the bill arrived in the Senate, many senators were concerned, among other things, that the bill seemed clearly in contradiction with the expressed will of Quebec, Manitoba, and Nunavut to limit the rights of individuals to grow their own cannabis for personal use. Québec had already tabled its own bill regarding the regulation of cannabis in the province on November 16, 2017 a er a special Summer-long consultation of the Committee on Health and Social Services. Jean-Marc Fournier, then-Minister of Intergovernmental Relations, went to the Senate on April 25, 2018 and argued that allowing individuals to grow as much as four plants was not part of the federal criminal law jurisdiction. As the debates continued in the Senate, the National Assembly echoed Fournier's remarks and adopted a unanimous resolution on May 9, 2018 to ask "that the Federal Government recognizes and respects the autonomy of Québec regarding the regulation of cannabis on its territory. " 26 e Assembly made sure to send the resolution speci cally to all senators even though this would cause "mailing delays. " 27 e Senate nally suggested 46 amendments, one of which would have given the provinces some latitude in deciding how many plants individuals could grow at home. e House of Commons refused to bend before this demand and returned the bill to the Senate in its original form.
e Senate nally decided to yield to the will of the Commons just before the summer recess, but many senators made sure to express their discontentment with the Government's intransigence and warned about its possible political consequences. 28 ese three events are the external manifestation of the rise of the Senate as a genuine federal political player. But it also has internal manifestations in the Québec provincial political landscape. For example, in June 2017, the Couillard Government released its new constitutional policy document: Québecers, our way of being Canadian. 29 e policy was meant to be a comprehensive overview and roadmap of the approach of the Couillard Government to federalism, intergovernmental relations, and the place of Québec in Canada. Among its many subjects, the policy criticized Trudeau's unilateralism in Senate appointments and asked that the Prime Minister consult with Québec before appointing senators. e document refers positively to the practice of Brian Mulroney between 1987 and 1990, 30 but fails to mention that this practice was a temporary provision of the Meech Lake Accord. 31 e rati cation of the Accord would have entrenched it in the Constitution, 32 but its fate apparently doomed the practice ever since. Perhaps for the rst time since the Charlottetown Accord, the role of Québec in the appointment of senators has returned to the fore in Québec provincial politics. 33 For example, in light of Trudeau's rst string of Senate appointments, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), Québec's then second opposition group and now governing party, introduced a bill in March 2016 to create a provincial mechanism to select Québec senators. e bill would have put in place a selection committee and a whole set of procedures through which Qué-bec could have selected its own senatorial candidates. ose selected through this mechanism would have then been submitted to the Prime Minister for appointment to the Senate. 34 e bill was defeated in the end, but its ideas are hardly far-fetched or out-of-touch with the political mainstream in Québec. Now in power since the provincial election of October 1, 2018, it remains to be seen how much the Coalition Avenir Québec is willing to push its "new nationalism" with regard to the Senate. e o cial policy of the party, adopted in 2016, urges "comprehensive Senate reform" but it is not clear what this really means for the newly elected government. Will a new version of their bill su ce? In any event, the election of a more resolutely nationalist Government in Québec -that does not threaten to separate from the rest of Canada and that seems willing to play within the institutions of Canadian federalism -is only likely to increase the pressure on the Senate coming from Québec in the upcoming years. e Bloc Québécois repeatedly asserted that its goal was to channel the consensus of the National Assembly in the House of Commons because "all decisions regarding the Qué-bec Nation can only come from and be a decision of the Québec State as expressed through its National Assembly. " 36 It would thus be a mistake to think that the Bloc has always sided with separatists on all issues. From 2003 to 2011, the Bloc had the largest share of the Québec deputation in the House of Commons while, at the Provincial level, the federalist Liberals were in power.
Political Fragmentation in
is did not prevent the Bloc from channeling the agreement of Québec's provincial MPs of all stripes, as expressed in unanimous resolutions adopted in the National Assembly on such issues as the opposition to the abolition of the long-gun registry, 37 the employment insurance reform, 38 the abolition of the mandatory long-form census, 39 or the creation of the Canadian Securities Regulator. 40 Likewise, during the 2011-2015 period, the NDP channeled the National Assembly's unanimous resolutions on several key issues, including mandatory bilingualism for Supreme Court judges, 41 the protection of the funding of Radio-Canada, 42 the opening of the federal government's con dential documents regarding the patriation of the Constitution 43 and the application of Bill 101 to businesses falling under federal jurisdiction 44 to name a few. 45 However, the 2015 federal election changed the situation. For the rst time, at least since 1980, Québecers have elected a diverse group of MPs and a very bare majority of Liberals to the House of Commons. As Louis Massicotte, professor of political science at Laval University, puts it, "it is as if Québecers, a er having turned their back to Canadian governance ever since 1993, a er the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, had decided to turn the page and to reinstate mainstream Canadian federal politics. " 46 With the disaggregation of the political representation coming from Québec in the 2015 federal election and the steady decline of political cleavages along constitutional lines in Québec politics, Québec MPs in the House of Commons might lose their status as the prime defenders of Québec's distinct political interests and identity in Ottawa. us, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Senate has emerged and lled this gap.
It is also worth noting that the electoral reform would have likely accelerated this phenomenon. 47 Canada's current rst-past-the-post system gives a legislative premium to electoral pluralities. 48 A more proportional electoral system would, ceteris paribus, greatly diminish the capacity of Québecers to send a large and homogenous cohort of MPs to the House of Commons that could channel their speci c political grievances. Regardless of the eventual reform of the electoral system, the fact that Québec's demographic weight in Canada has steadily declined in the last forty years -and will continue to do so according to projections 49 -is likely to put extra pressure on the Senate, at the expense of the House of Commons, as a primary channel for Québec's political grievances.
Conclusion
e new appointment procedure to the Senate may very well become one of Trudeau's most important legacy. Informal institutional changes can be the most consequential ones for the political safeguards of Canadian federalism. Will the "new" Senate become the favourite locus of contention of provinces over matters of federalism? Yes and no. On the one hand, it might become so for Québec because of its internal political dynamics and its important numerical representation in the Upper House. In all likelihood, Qué-bec's political elites will increasingly see senators as their allies in their ghts against centralizing tendencies of the federal government.
On the other hand, this renewed dynamism is not likely to decrease the reliance on the courts as the main watchdogs of Canadian federalism elsewhere in Canada. Alberta, for one, does not have the same kind of leverage in the Senate that Québec has. Nevertheless, cheap and rapid senatorial victories, even though they might be more fragile than hard-fought judicial ones, might for some time placate those who recently saw "Triple-E" reforms or outright abolition as the only two alternatives for the future of the Upper House of Parliament. Will the Supreme Court itself take notice of the reinvigorated Senate and use it to justify a more deferential approach towards the federal division of powers as its counterpart in the United States has done? Only time will tell. If the quarrel between Ottawa and Québec over cannabis spills over into the judicial arena, as both have promised it would if they had to defend the validity of their respective laws, we might know sooner rather than later. 
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